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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
plied. The issues of inscription and reinscription of the claim,
as well as the prescription of the right in rem and the right in
personam, have been discussed in prior issues of this Review."
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION
Lincoln Parish School Board v. Ruston College1 presented
the question (first impression) of whether a school board could
acquire title to property by thirty-year prescription. In 1887,
Robert Russ donated a tract of land to Ruston College, which
used the property until it ceased functioning in 1895. Then
there was a gap not explained in the evidence, following which
the property was used as a public school site until the building
burned in 1910. The school board then called a successful elec-
tion to raise money for the construction of a new building, which
became Ruston High School. The evidence establishes a con-
tinued uninterrupted possession of the property by the school
board as owner from 1911.
The trial court held in favor of the school board, and the
court of appeal affirmed. Several Louisiana and other civil
law authorities are appropriately cited to show that a school
board in Louisiana is a body corporate created by the state
vested with express power to acquire and alienate property as
well as the right to sue and be sued. The right to acquire land
by prescription is necessarily included in this power properly
vested in a properly created legal person; nor is there any prohi-
bition to exclude such a right. The argument that a school board
possesses only limited or restrictive powers is not apposite here
because the question at issue is within the granted powers.
One of the policy reasons underlying the civil law institution
of acquisitive prescription is to confirm the ownership of a
23. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term -
Security Devices, 24 LA. L. REV. 205, 208-10 (1964) ; Note, 24 LA. L. REV. 943
(1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 162 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 355, 164
So.2d 354 (1964).
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possessor whose title deed may be lost.2 It is therefore of com-
parative interest to know that in the common law on adverse
possession there is a similar idea in the "presumption of a lost
grant." However, the extensive quotations from American Juris-
prudence and Corpus Juris may give the impression that these
sources are authoritative bases for the decision in the instant
case. This is unnecessary and could be misleading.
It is of course correct that in the civil law ownership by
acquisitive prescription may be based upon a possession which
started by virtue of a written title or grant which cannot be
located, but it is not historically correct to say that "the word
tprescription' is from the Latin 'pre' and 'scriptio,' meaning a
prior writing.' 3 Apart from overlooking the use of the same
word in liberative prescription, the term is really an abbrevia-
tion for the "praescriptis verbis" in the formulary procedure of
the Roman law, or for the Latin expressions "praescriptio longi
temporis" and "praescriptio longissimi temporis."'4 By means
of certain words written in front of the regular formula ad-
dressed to the judex, the passage of time together with certain
conditions was given the effect of changing what would other-
wise be the result of the case.5
Possession and Tacking
The concept of possession which is essential for acquisitive
prescription is a difficult one and often tricky. When the situa-
tion is further complicated by a question of tacking, the problem
is even more difficult. However, the Civil Code and the French
commentators, together with the Louisiana jurisprudence, have
established a goodly number of rules and guide lines. One of
these is the basic code provision which limits the tacking of
possession only to that of one's author in title. In the case of
2. 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (An English translation by the Louisiana
Law Institute) no. 2645 (1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL], cited in prin-
cipal case 162 So. 2d at 423.
3. 162 So. 2d at 423.
4. 1 PLANIOL no. 2644.
5. RADIN, ROMAN LAW 363-64 (1.927) : "To facilitate procedure, the question
of ten years' possession was pleaded as a praescriptio (prescription), instead of
as an exception ... ; that is, it appeared in the formula, even before the nomina-
tion of the iudex. The praescriptio longi temporis soon became the commonest
of the prescriptions, and the term 'prescription' itself became the practical equiva-
lent of usucapion. It is interesting to note that, when the term was taken over
in the Middle Ages by English lawyers, it was falsely etymologized, and created
the fiction of a 'lost grant,' since the word prae-scriptio seems to mean, literally,
an antecedent writing."
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Noel v. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co.,6 the Supreme Court
reached a decision which might have reflected what some of
the parties believed to be the situation but which did great in-
justice to the established rules of Louisiana law. As to this
property, the case is res judicata; it is to be hoped, however,
that the decision will be limited to its own facts and that no
other applications or extensions will be made in the future.
The facts of the Noel case are not unduly complicated. A
man actually possessed thirty-eight acres in excess of the planta-
tion which he owned. At his death, the plantation was inherited
by his wife and children, one son continuing the physical pos-
session of the entire tract. This son then acquired by donation
and purchase the other heirs' shares of the plantation. In all
these transactions, the property description is of the original
plantation with no indication of the extra thirty-eight acres.
To hold, as the Supreme Court did, that there can be tacking of
possession without the juridical link of an author in title is
stepping out of bounds, and the decision of the majority has
already been subjected to careful and well-directed criticism.7
The majority may have been moved by what appeared to be the
understandings (or misunderstandings) of the parties, but the
decision was not in accordance with the law and should not be
repeated.
It does not follow that the record owner has been unduly
deprived of his property; there might be other bases on which
acquisitive prescription or the action in boundary8 could succeed
against them. Fortunately, one case does not make law in Lou-
isiana, and the harm to be avoided for the future is not to let
this decision create a tear in the fabric of the law.
Good Faith and Just Title
In Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Jones,9 a married woman made
an authentic act of sale of community property with her marital
status showing in the deed and with the knowledge of her hus-
See also BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN LAW 131, 392 (1925); GIRARD,
MANUEL ]bL] MENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 1046 (6th ed. 1918).
6. 245 La. 324, 158 So. 2d 179 (1963), reversing 148 So. 2d 891 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962).
7. Dissenting opinions in 245 La. at 347 and 354, 158 So. 2d at 188 and 190;
Notes, 24 LA. L. REV. 888 (1964), 38 TUL. L. REv. 575 (1964).
8. Distinguish privity of possession for boundary action under LA. CIVIL CODS
art. 852, and privity of title under art. 3494.
9. 160 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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band but without his participation in the deed. Of course, the
conveyance was a nullity, but since it was regular on its face
the court held that it constituted a "just title" for the ten-year
acquisitive prescription. In the concentration of the case on
whether this deed was a just title, not enough attention was
given to another essential element, namely, good faith. With
reference to this element, the court stated:
"There is no evidence in the record that Eudoxie Jones
was not in good faith in acquiring the property. She acquired
the land from the person she believed to be the owner of the
property. She made no examination of the records but ac-
cepted the deed from Martha Goldsmith at 'face value.' "10:
However, since the deed showed the vendor to be a married
woman, and since ignorance of the law is no excuse, it may be
questioned whether the transferee was legally in good faith.
In Menefee v. Pipes," after concluding that a certain convey-
ance was a simulation, the court held that a simulated deed
cannot constitute a just title for purposes of the ten-year ac-
quisitive prescription.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Many of the practical problems concerning liberative pre-
scription fall into three categories: (a) the classification of the
nature of the cause of action; (b) the starting point for the
period of prescription; and (c) interference with the running
of time- as do the cases herein discussed.
Nature of the Cause of Action
There continues to be dispute concerning the classification
(for purposes of liberative prescription) of the cause of action
against a physician for malpractice - is it ex delicto (one-year
prescription) or ex contractu (ten years) ? In last year's Sym-
posium, this problem was discussed at some length 12 in the
course of some critical observations on the decision in Phelps v.
Donaldson.'3 It is not meaningful, nor is is readily practical,
10. Id. at 431.
11. 159 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), writ denied, 245 La. 798, 161
rbo.2d 276 (1964).
12. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term-
Prescription, 24 LA. L. REV. 213-14 (1964).
13. 243 La. 1118, 150 So. 2d 35 (1963), affirming 142 So. 2d 585 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962).
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to distinguish the malpractice in an ordinary situation from
that where there is an expressed or implied agreement to war-
rant the success of the services. Nor can any legal or policy
considerations support the distinction between the liberative
prescription of three years against the doctor's claim for ordi-
nary fees and that of ten years if there has been a "contract"
for the performance of his services.1 4 A simple solution to extri-
cate the state of our law from this unnecessary multiplication
of confusion is to adhere to the civil law technique of reverting
to the original authoritative sources and classify in the same
category all actions arising out of the physician-patient relation-
ship for which Civil Code article 3538 provides a three-year
liberative prescription.
All these comments and observations are again applicable to
the new decision on the same problem in Brooks v. Robinson,15
where the court reached a result opposite to the Phelps decision
by adopting the distinction made, and giving it a new twist by
finding in the facts an instance of "non-performance" of what
the doctor should have done (ex contractu) as distinguished
from "unskillful performance" (ex delicto). When a doctor re-
ceives X-rays which show the possibility of active pulmonary
disease, and he takes no action to treat or even to notify the
patient, it is tweedle-dum or tweedle-dee to classify his mal-
practice as non-performance or unskillful performance for pur-
poses of liberative prescription.
In two cases, the actions were classified as suits in redhibi-
tion, and the liberative prescription of one year was applied.1
6
In Lewis v. Republic Supply Co.,I7 the principal plaintiff claimed
$23,000.00 damages caused by the breaking of a defective cable
and the defendant as third-party plaintiff sued his supplier and
the manufacturer. The action of the third party plaintiff was
classified as an action in redhibition. In Bayhi v. S. H. Kress &
Co.,I8 the same classification was given to a claim for damages
which resulted from the explosion of a bottle of nail polish.
According to Civil Code article 2520, the redhibitory action is
primarily for cancellation of a sale on account of a latent defect.
14. See Gore v. Veith, 156 So. 823 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
15. 163 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), writ denied, 246 La. 583, 165
So. 2d'481 (1964).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2534, 2545, 2546 (1870).
17. 155 So. 2d 200 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
18. 158 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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An action exclusively for damages caused by a latent defect
would seem to be a horse of a different color.
The classification of actions "on accounts" is often a trouble-
some matter because the word "account" is used in different
legal contexts. In Succession of Jones,19 the court properly re-
fused to apply the three-year prescription of article 3538, for
accounts of merchants and retailers and the like, to an action
against an executrix for an accounting of her administration.
Starting Point for Liberative Prescription
The underlying theory of liberative prescription is that a
creditor loses the right to enforce a claim when he has remained
inactive for a certain period during which he could have taken
action. When a debt is represented by a promissory note, pay-
able in monthly installments, there is a separate maturity date
for each installment upon default of which the creditor could
take immediate action against the debtor. Consequently, the
creditor's failure to act runs from the time that he could have
acted, and the liberative prescription runs against each install-
ment from the date of its default. This is what happened in
Anthon v. Knox 20 despite the contention that prescription should
not begin to run until after the due date of the last installment,
with the result that prescription was held to have been com-
pleted against some installments but not against others of the
same note.
A variation of this problem occurred in the case of Dassau
v. Seary,2 1 where the promissory note contained an automatic
acceleration clause which made all the installments due and
exigible upon the default in payment of any one. The due date
of this first defaulted payment was the starting point for libera-
tive prescription against the full balance due. This automatic
acceleration clause is to be distinguished from the elective ac-
celeration clause, which gives the creditor an option or right
to accelerate the maturity of the balance when there has been
a default in one payment. This latter type of situation existed
in Anthon v. Knox, and since the option to accelerate had not
been exercised, liberative prescription had completely run on
some installments but not on others. Considering the matter of
19. 155 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
20. 155 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
21. 158 So.2d 243 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
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liberative prescription as well as the exigibility of the debt, an
acceleration clause can be a two-edged instrument, albeit much
sharper on one edge than the other.
A problem in fixing the starting point for liberative pre-
scription against an action in damages sometimes lies in the
distinction between the case where the operating cause of the
damage is continuous and the situation where an original single
cause results in damages which are progressive. In Deaton V.
Causey,22 the excavation and grading work done on one property
created a change in the natural drainage of surface water, and
this drainage brought on a constant washing to the neighboring
property. This operating cause of damage was continuous so
that the trial court's sustaining of the exception of no cause of
action on a plea of prescription was overruled, and the case was
remanded for a hearing on the merits and the prescription
issue.
The liberative prescription against the action in redhibition
is one year from the date of the sale or from the vendee's dis-
covery of the vice.23 In Brown v. Dauzat,24 where the contractor-
vendor corrected several defects in a newly-constructed house,
the court held that the prescription against the vendee did not
commence until the vendor abandoned attempts to repair any
more defects. Two different rationales are given: one, that
until the seller abandons his efforts to remedy the defects, the
buyer is not definitely put on notice that a redhibitory suit will
be necessary; the other, that the continual repair efforts con-
stitute repeated interruptions, and that the prescription only
begins to run again upon the discovery of the defects in the
repair work. The difference is not significant in the present
case, but would be important for the distinction between the
two ways in which the exercise of a right can be lost by the
lapse of time. Some rights are lost by the passage of the speci-
fied time which runs without the possibility of any interference;
this is sometimes called a forfeiture (or a peremption, or a fixed
delay) rather than a prescription. The decision under discussion
is predicated upon the assumption that the redhibitory action
22. 154 So. 2d 267 (La. App, 2d Cir. 1963).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2534, 2546 (1870).
24. 157 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
[Vol.,XXV
PRIVATE LAW
is subject to the ordinary prescription rather than a period of
forfeiture, as is the case, for example, for the revocatory action.2 5
In fixing such a relatively short time for the redhibitory
action, the codifiers and their sources were pursuing a policy
of stability and early finality for sales contracts; on the other
hand, there is also a venerable policy in the Brown case to en-
courage amicable settlement of disputes instead of forcing early
litigation. When a relatively short prescription appears along
with the substantive rules of a given institution instead of being
in the general rules of prescription, it is not unlikely that this
is intended as a period of forfeiture.26
The clarification of this point would also answer questions
not posed in the principal case, such as when prescription begins
to run if the vendor has timely notice and agrees to correct the
defect but does not do so. The agreement to make the repair
may well be for the sake of maintaining good relations and
without admission of liability, so that it might not suffice to
constitute an acknowledgment for purposes of interruption.
Interference with the Running of Time
A payment on account constitutes an acknowledgment with-
in the meaning of Civil Code article 3520 and causes an inter-
ruption, thereby wiping out the elapsed period and starting
afresh on a new one. Where there are several purchases on a
single running account, a "payment on account" may well inter-
rupt prescription on the whole open account. However, in Grand
Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. St. Pierre,27 the payments were made with
identification (imputation) of specific invoices, and therefore
did not constitute acknowledgments or interruptions of the
regular three-year prescription against the remaining items.
In Humphreys v. McComiskey,28 the court applied the well-
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1987 (1870) ; and Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann.
102, 5 So. 539, 542 (1889).
26. E.g., action in disavowal, LA. CIvI CODE arts. 191, 192; revocatory
action, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1987, Ashbey v. Ashbey, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539
(1889) ; action for supplement or diminution of price, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2498,
Sewell v. Willcox, 5 Rob. 83 (La. 1843) ; action to set aside tax sale, LA. CONST.
art. X, § 11, Hollingsworth v. Schanland, 155 La. 825, 99 So. 613 (1924) ; ac-
tions for lesion, LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1876, 2595, Laenger v. Laenger, 138 La.
542, 70 So. 501 (1916) ; action to revoke a donation, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1561;
action of redhibition in sale of animals, LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2535. See also
Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953), and cases cited therein.
27. 163 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
28. 159 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
19'65]
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fixed rule that a timely suit against one tortfeasor interrupts
prescription for other joint tortfeasors. 29 Thus, a timely suit
against a doctor preserved the effectiveness of the cause of
action; and, when it was later alleged that the hospital was a
joint tortfeasor, the hospital's insurer could not be released on
account of prescription even though the hospital might plead
the personal defense of charitable immunity.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL LEASES
Obligation To Protect Against Drainage
One of the most significant decisions rendered during the
1963-64 term was Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum Corp,1
in which plaintiff sought to recover damages for his lessee's
failure to prevent drainage of oil and gas from beneath plain-
tiff's premises. The essential allegations of plaintiff's petition
were that: plaintiff owned the land in question; defendant held
a mineral lease on the land in question granted by plaintiff;
defendant also held a lease on adjoining property; defendant
had drilled a well within eighty feet of plaintiff's property line;
approximately half of the oil drained from that well was drained
from beneath plaintiff's property; defendant had been pre-
viously placed in default; and, therefore, plaintiff was entitled
to damages equal to one-half of the one-eighth royalty from the
draining well. The trial judge sustained an exception of no
cause of action, and plaintiff appealed.
Despite the fact that the Third Circuit Court of Appeal sus-
tained the judgment of the lower court, this decision is full of
meaning for both lessors and lessees in Louisiana. First, the
court rather clearly sustained defendant's exception of no cause
of action on the ground that plaintiff had not made proper
allegations. The opinion strongly asserts the existence of a
29. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2097, 3552 (1870).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 163 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), writs denied, 246 La. 581, 165
So. 2d 481.
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